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Andrew Koppelman
The gay rights question has become a chronic irritant in constitutional
law. For more than twenty years, commentators' and courts' have debated
whether state action that imposes special burdens on homosexuals violates
the Constitution. The Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,3
which upheld the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions of sodomy, has
exacerbated the controversy rather than resolving it. The present state of
confusion should trouble not only constitutional lawyers,4 but all
Americans.
At the center of the debate is the constitutionality of the sodomy stat-
utes. While enforcement of these laws is sporadic at best, this is as poor a
measure of the injury they inflict as the relative infrequency of lynching
in the post-Civil War South. By branding all gays as criminals, the sod-
omy prohibition provides a justification for other forms of discrimination,
public and private, which injure gays in such areas as employment, pro-
fessional licensing, free speech, immigration, adoption, and child custody.'
1. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981), and citations therein.
2. See Annotation, Validity of Statute Making Sodomy a Criminal Offense, 20 A.L.R.4th 1009
(1983 & Supp. 1988) (collecting cases).
3. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. One of whom concluded, after surveying the arguments, that "no defensible criteria [for resolv-
ing such disputes about fundamental rights] exist." Brest, supra note 1, at 1065.
5. See Brief of Amicus Lesbian Rights Project at 21-24, Bowers (No. 85-140); Brief of Amicus
Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund at 25-30, Bowers, and citations therein. Like hetero-
sexuals, not all homosexuals engage in sexual intercourse. But courts have frequently overlooked this
fact, invoking the sodomy statutes to justify a broad range of discriminations against gays without
requiring evidence that the particular party before them had violated any law. Id.
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Perhaps equally significant is the sheer insult that the statutes impose. As
Richard Mohr observes, "unenforced sodomy laws are the chief systematic
way that society as a whole tells gays they are scum. '
The debate over the constitutionality of these statutes has centered upon
two intractable issues. First, the familiar argument that the sodomy stat-
utes violate the constitutional right to privacy 7 resists principled resolu-
tion, because the Court has never explained how it goes about determin-
ing whether any given activity is protected by that right. As Judge Bork
observed, the holdings of the privacy cases "are less prescriptions of a
mode of reasoning than they are conclusions about particular rights enun-
ciated."8 This ambiguity was not resolved by the Court's conclusory rejec-
tion of the privacy argument in Bowers.9
Second, several authors,10 with encouragement from at least two mem-
bers of the Supreme Court," have argued that homosexuality should be a
suspect classification, like race, whose use in distributing legal burdens
triggers heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 But while this argument has the merit of
reflecting social reality-like blacks, gays have historically been politically
powerless and subject to pervasive discrimination based on prejudice-its
support in existing constitutional doctrine is uncertain. This is because,
once again, the Court has not explained how it determines the boundary
6. Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 43,
53 (1986-87).
7. The right to privacy appears to be the most frequently litigated challenge to the sodomy laws.
See Annotation, supra note 2, § 3; see also Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83, 99-100 (almost all scholarly literature on privacy cases
between 1965 and 1979 construed them as constitutionalizing sexual libertarianism).
8. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
9. See Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHi. L. REV.
648, 652-56 (1987); Gewirtz, The Court Was 'Superficial' in the Homosexuality Case, N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1986, at A21, col. 1.
10. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797
(1984).
11. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."). Since Bowers, two federal courts have adopted this argument. See
Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, reh'g en banc ordered, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.
1988); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1987). But see Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v.
Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045, 1056-57 (W.D. Ark. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 850 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1988).
The Bowers Court considered only the privacy argument, and expressly refrained from deciding
any aspect of the equal protection issue. 478 U.S. at 196 n.8; see also id. at 201 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting Court's "refusal to consider" equal protection clause); Sunstein, Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection,
55 U. CMI. L. REV. (forthcoming 1988) (arguing that gays' equal protection claim remains persuasive
even after Bowers).
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of the legal category. "The cases ...have told us that some classifica-
tions are suspect and some are not; what they do not do is tell us why."13
In order to break this impasse, this Note will suggest a third path.14 Its
argument builds upon a series of cases in which the Court has established
a criterion of constitutionality which, if not a model of clarity, is at least
considerably more determinate than those it has used in the areas of pri-
vacy and suspect classifications. The argument explores an analogy sug-
gested, but not developed, in both the dissents in Bowers: the analogy be-
tween the sodomy statutes and the Jim Crow miscegenation laws, which
the Court declared unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia.5 The Note
will conclude that sodomy and miscegenation statutes violate the equal
protection clause for the same reason: Beyond the immediate harm they
inflict upon their victims, their purpose is to support a regime of caste that
locks some people into inferior social positions at birth. Miscegenation
laws discriminated on the basis of race, and they did so in order to main-
tain white supremacy. Similarly, sodomy laws discriminate on the basis of
sex-for example, permitting men, but not women, to have sex with
women-in order to impose traditional sex roles. The Court has deemed
this purpose impermissible in other contexts because it perpetuates the
subordination of women. The same concern applies with special force to
the sodomy laws, because their function is to maintain the polarities of
gender on which the subordination of women depends. Thus, if the Court
is to maintain the commitment to equality that has animated the equal
protection jurisprudence of the past thirty-five years, it cannot uphold the
sodomy laws and was wrong to do so in Bowers.
Part I of the Note reviews the opinions in Bowers and their discussions
of the miscegenation analogy. Part II applies the precedents laid down in
the Court's miscegenation decisions to demonstrate that the sodomy laws
impose a sex-based classification and should therefore be subject to height-
ened scrutiny. Part III demonstrates that the purpose of the sodomy laws
is the constitutionally impermissible one of imposing traditional sex roles.
Finally, Part IV addresses the potential political difficulties that are raised
by the argument's applications.
13. J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 119 (1983). See also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe Court provides no principled foundation for determining when
more searching inquiry is to be invoked.").
14. These three alternatives do not exhaust the constitutional issues raised by anti-gay state ac-
tion. Frequently, an individual is penalized for merely saying that he or she is homosexual; this raises
serious First Amendment problems. See Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1011-14 (Brennan, J., joined by Mar-
shall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); J. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protec-
tion for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity (1988) (draft on file with author).
15. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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I. BOWERS V. HARDWICK AND THE LOVING ANALOGY
In Bowers, the Supreme Court, split five to four, reversed a decision by
the Eleventh Circuit that Georgia's criminalization of sodomy violated the
constitutionally protected right to privacy. The Constitution, Justice
White declared in the majority opinion, does not confer upon homosexuals
a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, because "[p]roscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots." 6 While earlier cases did create a right
to privacy extending to child-rearing and education, family relationships,
procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion, "none of the rights an-
nounced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this
case." 17 Because no fundamental right was involved, the Constitution re-
quired only some rational basis for the law, and the Court found sufficient
"the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homo-
sexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.""
Justices Blackmun and Stevens each wrote dissenting opinions, both
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall."' Both suggested that Loving
demonstrated the unsoundness of the majority's analysis. Blackmun ar-
gued that Loving revealed the fallacy of the argument "that either the
length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with
which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scru-
tiny."20 In a footnote, he added that "[tihe parallel between Loving and
this case is almost uncanny," and observed that both of the challenged
laws had religious justifications, that both were similar to laws on the
books when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and that in both
cases many states still had similar laws on the books at the time the case
was decided.2 "Yet the Court held, not only that the invidious racism of
Virginia's law violated the Equal Protection Clause . . . but also that the
law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying them the 'freedom of
16. 478 U.S. at 192.
17. Id. at 190-91 (citing cases).
18. Id. at 196. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell filed concurring opinions. Burger noted
that condemnation of homosexual practices "is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards." Id. Powell wrote that "a prison sentence for such conduct-certainly a sentence of long
duration-would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue" of excessive punishment, id. at 197, but
concluded that this issue was not before the court because Hardwick "has not been tried, much less
convicted and sentenced." Id. at 198. But see Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 232-33, 500 S.W.2d 368,
373 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974) (rejecting claim that eight-year sentences for single act
of consensual homosexual sex constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
19. Blackmun argued that "this case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.'" 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Stevens
argued that since the statute by its terms applied to all sodomy, heterosexual or homosexual, even if
the partners were married, it ran directly afoul of the right to marital privacy announced in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Nor had Georgia articulated any "neutral and legitimate inter-
est" justifying selective enforcement. 478 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 210 n.5.
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choice to marry' that had 'long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' "22
Stevens, too, observed that "neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack."28 In a footnote, he
added that "[i]nterestingly, miscegenation was once treated as a crime
similar to sodomy." '24
This Note argues that the miscegenation analogy is an even more pow-
erful tool for constitutional analysis than these opinions recognize: The
Court's miscegenation precedents, together with its sex discrimination ju-
risprudence, are sufficient to invalidate the sodomy laws.
II. SODOMY LAW AS SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATION
A. The Threshold Question
The threshold question is whether statutes that prohibit intercourse be-
tween persons of the same sex impose a sex-based classification. If they
do, then the statute's validity is cast into doubt. Gender classifications trig-
ger heightened scrutiny-not, to be sure, as intensive as that applied to
racial classifications, but nonetheless exacting.25
It appears that only one court has considered this constitutional ques-
tion,28 and it has answered it in the negative. In State v. Walsh,27 the
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a lower court's declaration that a
statute prohibiting "deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the
same sex"2 deprived the defendant of equal protection because "'the stat-
ute would not be applicable to the defendant if he were a female.' "2
The State concedes that the statute prohibits men from doing what
women may do, namely, engage in sexual activity with men. How-
ever, the State argues that it likewise prohibits women from doing
something which men can do: engage in sexual activity with women.
We believe it applies equally to men and women because it prohibits
22. Id. at 211 n.5 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
23. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 216 n.9. The analogy with Loving was also suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Watkins
v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1351-52, reh'g en banc ordered, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.
1988).
25. The Court has held that "the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on
the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for
the classification." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Kirch-
berg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981), and Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979)); cf. infra note 55 and accompanying text.
26. The sex discrimination issue was raised, but not reached, in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1144 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
27. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
28. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090.1(3) (Vernon 1979).
29. 713 S.W.2d at 509.
1988]
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both classes from engaging in sexual activity with members of their
own sex. Thus, there is no denial of equal protection on that basis.
30
The Missouri court's argument is essentially that of an 1883 Supreme
Court decision, Pace v. Alabama,3' in which the Court considered for the
first time the constitutionality of the miscegenation laws. The statute in
question in Pace prescribed penalties for interracial sex more severe than
those imposed for adultery or fornication between persons of the same
race. The Court unanimously rejected the equal protection challenge to
the statute, and denied that the two sections discriminated on the basis of
race:
[The section prohibiting interracial sex] prescribes a punishment for
an offence which can only be committed where the two sexes are of
different races. There is in neither section any discrimination against
either race . . . . Whatever discrimination is made in the punish-
ment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offence
designated and not against the person of any particular color or race.
The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is
the same. 2
The structure of Walsh's reasoning is identical to that of Pace: The Mis-
souri statute prescribes a punishment for an offense which can only be
committed where the two participants are of the same sex, and it is di-
rected against the offense designated and not against the person of any
particular sex.
But Pace is no longer good law. It was repudiated by the Supreme
Court in the next miscegenation case it considered, McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida.33 In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education,34 the McLaughlin
Court, again unanimously, invalidated a criminal statute prohibiting an
unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in and occupying the
same room at night. "It is readily apparent," wrote Justice White for the
Court, that the statute "treats the interracial couple made up of a white
person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple."3 In re-
sponse to the state's reliance on Pace, White declared that "Pace repre-
sents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not with-
30. Id. at 510. The same argument has been used to reject Title VII claims that discrimination
against gays is sex discrimination. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd, 569
F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 507 F. Supp. 10
(S.D. Fla. 1980) (discrimination against lesbians may constitute actionable "sex-plus" discrimination,
but employer can rebut charge by showing that it discriminates equally against gay men).
31. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
32. Id. at 585.
33. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 379 U.S. at 188.
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stood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court." 6 Racial
classifications, he concluded, can only be sustained by a compelling state
interest. Since the state had failed to establish that the law served "some
overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified
conduct when engaged in by a white person and a Negro, but not other-
wise,13 7 the statute fell as "an invidious discrimination forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause."
'38
McLaughlin stands for the proposition (which should be obvious even
without judicial support) that if a statute defines prohibited conduct by
reference to a characteristic, then the statute is not neutral with respect to
that characteristic. Thus, the appropriate rejoinder to arguments like that
of the Missouri court is that if the defendant had been a woman, he could
not have been prosecuted for engaging in sexual conduct with a man.39
Indeed, the sexes of the participants would appear to be one of the mate-
rial elements of the crime that the prosecution must prove.4" To para-
phrase McLaughlin, it is readily apparent that the statute treats the same-
sex couple differently than it does any other couple. "Such a practice does
not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows 'treatment of a
person in a manner which but for the person's sex would be different.'"
B. Facially Gender-Neutral Statutes
Of the twenty-five states that still prohibit consensual sodomy, only
seven have statutes which apply only to homosexual behavior. 2 The stat-
utes of eighteen states and the District of Columbia, however, prohibit
oral or anal sex regardless of whether the sexes of the participants are the
same.4 It may thus appear that these, at least, do not classify on the basis
36. Id.
37. Id. at 192.
38. Id. at 192-93; cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (rejecting Pace-like defense of
racially restrictive covenants, because "[eiqual protection is not achieved through indiscriminate impo-
sition of inequalities.").
39. Cf Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 566, 325 A.2d 740, 742 (1974) (antidis-
crimination case rejecting defense that firing of white employee because he was engaged to black
woman "involved not his own race, but rather his fiancee's"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
40. Cf Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538, 542 (1885):
To be a negro is not a crime; to marry a white woman is not a crime; but to be a negro, and
being a negro, to marry a white woman is a felony; therefore, it is essential to the crime that
the accused shall be a negro-unless he is a negro he is guilty of no offence.
41. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (Title
VII prohibits assessment of larger pension fund contributions from female employees, even though as
a class women live longer than men) (quoting Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971)).
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1987); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090.1(3) (Vernon
1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(20), 45-5-505 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190
(Michie 1986); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1968).
43. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60(2), 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARsz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-
1412 (Supp. 1987) (oral sex excluded, State v. Potts, 75 Ariz. 211, 213, 254 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1953));
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (Harrison 1976); GA. CODE ANN. §
1988]
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of sex. But the usefulness of the miscegenation analogy has not yet been
exhausted."'
It seems to be settled law, following the right to marital privacy an-
nounced in Griswold v. Connecticut,15 that such statutes are unconstitu-
tional as applied to married couples.46 Thus, men may commit sodomitic
sex acts with women if they marry them. But because every state forbids
gay couples to marry, they cannot escape the prohibition of sodomy. The
only basis of this discrimination is sex.
In the Jim Crow South, interracial marriages were not invariably
criminalized as such. In some states, such marriages were simply void, in
the same way that a gay marriage is today. There were nonetheless crimi-
nal prosecutions for fornication.4' The fornication statutes were race-
neutral, but the guilt or innocence of the defendants was dependent upon
their race. Similarly, so long as states forbid gays from marrying and thus
from bringing themselves under the protection of Griswold, the use of
facially gender-neutral sodomy laws to make criminals of them discrimi-
nates invidiously on the basis of sex.
48
These statutes may also be sex-based because they manifest an inten-
tion to injure gays. The test for evaluating facially gender-neutral statutes
that allegedly discriminate on the basis of sex was set forth by the Court
in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.49 Although adverse "impact pro-
16-6-2 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553, 554 (1987); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 1970); MiceH.
ComP. LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338a, 750.338b (1981); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973) (excluding cunnilingus, because "[plenetration of the body is
essential to the offense," State v. Hill, 179 Miss. 732, 735, 176 So. 719, 720 (1937)); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1981) (cunnilingus illegal only if tongue penetrates vagina, State v. Joyner, 295
N.C. 55, 66, 243 S.E.2d 367, 374 (1978)); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 886, 887 (1983) (tongue must
penetrate, Hicks v. State, 713 P.2d 18, 20 (1986)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-403 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1982) (tongue must penetrate, Ryan v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 439, 444, 247 S.E.2d 698, 702 (1978)).
44. The argument of the following two paragraphs was suggested by Prof. Akhil Amar of Yale
Law School.
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351
(4th Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968). Since Griswold, there has been no authority to the
contrary.
47. See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877); State v. Hooper, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 201 (1844);
State v. Fore, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 378 (1841); Bartelle v. United States, 2 Okla. Crim. 84, 100 P. 45
(1908). One court explained that its state originally penalized only the clergyman who performed the
marriage, but that this did not prevent the parties from continuing to live as man and wife. The
newer law voiding the marriage, and thus subjecting them to prosecution for fornication, was a more
effective remedy for this "evil." State v. Melton, 44 N.C. (Bush.) 49, 51 (1852).
48. Cf Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979) ("If the impact of this statute could
not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification
made by the law was in fact not neutral."). But cf Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (discrimi-
nation against pregnant persons is not sex-based discrimination).
49. 442 U.S. 265 (1979). In order to be facially neutral, and thus to be appropriately scrutinized
under the Feeney test, a statute must, of course, be neutrally applied. Id. at 272 (citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). If a facially neutral statute is enforced only against gays, it is
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vides an 'important starting point' . . . purposeful discrimination is 'the
condition that offends the Constitution.' "" The Feeney Court borrowed
its intent-based test for invidious discrimination from Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., a racial discrimi-
nation case.51 Arlington Heights held that a plaintiff is not required "to
prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory
purposes. . . .[R]acial discrimination is not just another competing con-
sideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been
a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer
justified.
'52
In each of the states where sodomy statutes remain on the books, ani-
mus against lesbians and gays has been a major, if not the sole, reason for
the decision to retain them. It has surely been "a motivating factor." For
example, while Georgia's statute is facially gender-neutral, the state de-
fended it before the Supreme Court "both in its brief and at oral argu-
ment . . . solely on the grounds that it prohibits homosexual activity."'53
These statutes are thus constitutionally equivalent to those which are ex-
pressly directed solely against gays. 54
equivalent to a facially anti-gay statute, regardless of the legislators' intent. Cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at
203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. 442 U.S. at 274 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971)).
51. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). While Arlington Heights was a racial discrimination case, the Feeney
Court declared that its "principles apply with equal force to a case involving alleged gender discrimi-
nation." 442 U.S. at 274.
52. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 (emphasis supplied); accord Feeney, 442 U.S. at 276,
277.
53. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It did so because the statute would con-
cededly have been unconstitutional if it were construed to apply, as by its terms it did, to sodomitic
acts committed by married couples. Tr. of Oral Argument at 8, Bowers. Similarly, the desire to re-
press homosexuality was the major "motivating factor" in the retention of the District of Columbia's
sodomy statute, which is facially gender-neutral. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981). In 1981, the
D.C. City Council, by a vote of 13 to 0, decided to repeal this statute. The decision was overturned by
a vote of the House of Representatives, which under the Home Rule Act of 1973 retains the right to
invalidate any act of the D.C. government. In the debate preceding the House vote, homosexuality
was a major theme, while heterosexual sodomy was barely discussed. "A vote to table or postpone is a
vote to legalize sodomous homosexual liaisons," Representative Philip Crane, the sponsor of the reso-
lution disapproving the Council's action, declared. 127 CONG. REc. 22,749 (1981). According to Rep-
resentative Larry McDonald, if the House let the Council's vote stand, "then we are clearly saying
that God owes Sodom and Gomorrah an apology." Id. at 22,752. See also id. at 22,750 (remarks of
Rep. Daniel Crane); id. at 22,771 (remarks of Rep. Dan Marriott); id. at 22,766 (remarks of Rep.
Parren Mitchell) (deploring debate's exclusive focus on homosexuality).
54. Even the traditional prohibition of sodomy, which did not distinguish homosexual from heter-
osexual acts, may have manifested an intent to maintain sexual boundaries. The prohibition's applica-
tion to heterosexual sex, by forbidding any person, male or female, from engaging in any sexual act
which it is anatomically possible for a person of the opposite sex to perform, reinforces the ideology of
"men being entirely distinct from women in use, in function, in posture and position, in role, in
'nature.'" A. DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 160 (1987); see also id. at 156-57.
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III. SODOMY LAW AS SEX DISCRIMINATION
It has thus far been established that the sodomy laws establish sex-
based classifications, and therefore, in order to withstand constitutional
challenge, "must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."5 But this
verbal formula, without more, seems so vague as to be practically mean-
ingless.56 In this Section, Subsection A will show that in application the
Court has given this test at least this much meaning: Sex-based classifica-
tions are unconstitutional if their purpose is to impose traditional sex
roles. Subsection B will then argue that this is precisely the purpose that
the sodomy laws serve, and that such laws therefore violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Finally, Subsection C will argue that if this impermissible
purpose is excluded from consideration, these statutes seem purposeless
indeed and thus cannot withstand even minimal scrutiny.
A. The Constitutional Test for Sex-Based Classifications
McLaughlin simply ignored the purpose of the statute it was scrutiniz-
ing. One writer suggests that the Court did this because it was a "simpler
and easier" way to invalidate the statute: "Declaring that all racial dis-
crimination was suspect eliminated any need to show that antimiscegena-
tion laws were premised on racial inequality. . . ."" Indeed, McLaugh-
lin does not seem to have relied on strict scrutiny as such, since a statute
that has no purpose at all cannot even survive the lenient "rational rela-
tionship" test. Similarly, it is possible for a court to simply hold that the
sex-based classification imposed by a sodomy law is arbitrary and there-
fore unconstitutional.58 But this, like McLaughlin, fails to address the
powerful moral convictions that the statute reflects. To be persuasive, an
argument against the sodomy laws must show that such moral convictions
are not a sufficient justification for the law. The miscegenation laws were
not purposeless exercises of state power, and neither are the sodomy laws.
The McLaughlin Court, in invalidating a prohibition of interracial co-
habitation, expressly refrained from reaching the question of the validity
of the state's prohibition of interracial marriage. 9 When that issue was
resolved three years later, in Loving v. Virginia,6 the Court finally dis-
cerned the purpose that underlay the miscegenation statutes."1 This time,
55. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
56. See id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (test is "so diaphanous and elastic as to invite sub-
jective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as
judgments whether such legislation is directed at 'important' objectives or, whether the relationship to
those objectives is 'substantial' enough.").
57. J. BAER, supra note 13, at 118.
58. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
59. 379 U.S. at 195, 196.
60. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
61. One earlier Supreme Court decision did recognize the actual significance of the miscegenation
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the state abandoned Pace and simply appealed for judicial restraint: "[I]t
is the exclusive province of the Legislature of each State to make the de-
termination for its citizens as to the desirability of a policy of permitting
or preventing such alliances-a province which the judiciary may not con-
stitutionally invade."'6 2 Justice Stewart responded, as he had in McLaugh-
lin, that "'it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our
Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race
of the actor.' "" But no other Justice joined Stewart's concurrence.
Rather, the majority in Loving focused directly on the purpose of the stat-
ute's racial classifications.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, observed that the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia had held "that the State's legitimate pur-
poses were 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent
'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the oblitera-
tion of racial pride,' obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White
Supremacy."8 4 On this evidence, he concluded that "the racial classifica-
tions must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to main-
tain White Supremacy,"6 and that the purpose of the statute thus "vio-
lates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 6
As with race, the Court has not confined its pronouncements on gender
to denunciations of irrationality, but has also inquired into the purposes
served by sex-based classifications. It has explained that the reason for
heightened scrutiny is that "[c]lassifications based upon gender, not unlike
those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive
and often subtle discrimination. 1 7 It is because sex-based classifications
have been instruments of the subordination of women that they arouse
judicial suspicion; otherwise, they would not need any greater justification
than a rational relationship to a permissible state purpose.68
In determining whether a statute serves important governmental objec-
tives, the Court has held that "[clare must be taken in ascertaining
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic no-
tions."69 These "archaic and stereotypic notions" are often identified as
being merely inaccurate empirical generalizations.70 But the impermissible
statutes as a "stigma, of the deepest degradation . . . fixed upon the whole [black] race." Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 409 (1857).
62. Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
63. 388 U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 198 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
64. Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955)).
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
68. On the rational relationship test, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985), and citations therein.
69. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
70. See, e.g., id. at 725-26; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality
opinion).
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notions also include the normative notion that women should not act in
ways that are unseemly for their sex. The Court has consistently struck
down statutes the purpose of which was the imposition of traditional gen-
der roles.71
The rationale for these holdings is most clearly evident in Stanton v.
Stanton,7 12 in which the Court invalidated a statute requiring parents to
support their sons until age twenty-one, but their daughters only until age
eighteen. The state argued in defense of the law "that it is the man's
primary responsibility to provide a home and that it is salutary for him to
have education and training before he assumes that responsibility.17 3 The
Court acknowledged that this "may be true,"74  but it remained
unpersuaded.
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing
of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world
of ideas . . . . To distinguish between the two on educational
grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so
long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long
as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides
with the role-typing society has long imposed. 5
This holding is inexplicable in terms of the statute's rationality. If the
state's purpose was to maintain a pattern of sex relationships in which "it
is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home," so that women
71. Mississippi Univ. for Women held unconstitutional a state nursing school's policy of denying
admission to males. The Court observed that the exclusion of males "tends to perpetuate the stereo-
typed view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." 458 U.S. at 729. This policy "lends credibility
to the old view that women, not men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is
a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy." Id. at 730. The Court also noted evidence indicating
that this putatively preferential treatment had harmed rather than helped women: "Officials of the
American Nurses Association have suggested that excluding men from the field has depressed nurses'
wages." Id. at 729 n.15.
In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the Court invalidated a law permitting alimony payments to be
imposed only on husbands upon divorce. The Court noted that its "prior cases settle" that the Consti-
tution does not permit laws "announcing the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibili-
ties under which the wife plays a dependent role, and . . . seeking for their objective the reinforce-
ment of that model among the State's citizens." Id. at 279. "Legislative classifications which distribute
benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women," and therefore "must be carefully tailored" to avoid carrying "the baggage
of sexual stereotypes." Id. at 283.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Court invalidated a Social Security provi-
sion that granted lower survivors' benefits to widowers and their children than to widows and their
children. The traditional sexual division of labor, the Court held, could not justify "the denigration of
the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families' sup-
port." Id. at 645. "The fact that a man is working while there is a wife at home does not mean that
he would, or should be required to, continue to work if his wife dies." Id. at 651-52 (emphasis
added).
72. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
73. Id. at 14; see Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 318-19, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974); Brief
for Appellee at 18, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (No. 73-1461).
74. 421 U.S. at 14.
75. Id. at 14-15.
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would remain economically dependent on men, then this statute would
appear to be quite narrowly tailored to that goal. The fact that the prac-
tice promoted in the statute "coincides with the role-typing society has
long imposed" should be a strength, not a weakness, under the rational
relationship test. The problem with the statute is rather that it forces
women to follow traditional sex roles and thus keeps them locked in a
subordinate social and economic position." For this reason, the imposition
of role-typing can never constitute an "important governmental objec-
tive[]."" It is, indeed, not even a permissible one.7 8 The Court has not
announced any exception for cases in which the desire for role-typing is so
powerful that it takes the form of deep moral conviction. To do so would
vitiate the principle altogether, since all sexual role-typing has tradition-
ally been thought to possess such moral force. 9
76. Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was intended to
work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.").
77. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
78. Those decisions in which the Court has upheld traditional gender classifications are not to the
contrary, because in those cases the classifications were found to comport with, rather than to impose,
differences between the sexes. Thus, for example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981), the Court upheld a statutory rape law which punished the male, but not the female, partici-
pant in intercourse when the female was under 18 and not the male's wife. "Because virtually all of
the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the
young female," Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion explained, "a legislature acts well within its
authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences
of his conduct." Id. at 473. Thus, the statute did not rest merely on "'the baggage of sexual stereo-
types.'" Id. at 476 (quoting Orr, 440 U.S. at 283). Rehnquist nowhere suggests that such stereotyp-
ing is permissible; instead he relies on the fact that "this Court has consistently upheld statutes where
the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances." Id. at 469.
This distinction has been criticized for insulating longstanding patterns of domination from scru-
tiny. Some differences between the sexes are quite real, but arguably exist only because they have
been imposed by society for a long time. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 120-21 (1979); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984).
But whatever the deficiencies of the Court's approach, this Note does not rely on a radical revision of
the Court's sex discrimination doctrine. It argues only that the existing doctrine should be applied
consistently. But cf Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187,
229 [hereinafter Law, Homosexuality] (arguing that Court has failed to hold squarely that enforcing
traditional visions of family and sexuality is not legitimate state interest, and that this makes it diffi-
cult for gays to argue that these traditional concepts are insufficient to justify denial of their liberty).
79. For example, in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872), in which the Court
upheld a law that forbade women to practice law, Justice Bradley, concurring, explained the powerful
moral beliefs on which his decision rested: "The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Compare the
following statement of why lesbianism is forbidden: "The Creator has endowed the bodies of women
with the noble mission of motherhood and the bringing of human life into the world. Any woman who
violates this great trust by participating in homosexuality not only degrades herself socially but also
destroys the purpose for which God created her." This statement was part of a 1952 indoctrination
lecture on homosexuality given by Navy chaplains to WAVE recruits, reprinted in B&ubE &
D'Emilio, The Military and Lesbians during the McCarthy Years, 9 SIGNS 759, 769 (1984). The
miscegenation laws, of course, rested on equally powerful moral convictions:
The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the highest
advancement of our cherished southern civilization, under which two distinct races are to work
out and accomplish the destiny to which the Almighty has assigned them on this continent-all
require that they should be kept distinct and separate, and that connections and alliances so
unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law, and
be subject to no evasion.
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B. The Function of the Sodomy Laws
Do statutes that outlaw homosexual sex impose traditional sex roles?
One possible answer is that of McLaughlin: The crime is by definition
one of engaging in activity inappropriate to one's sex. But these statutes'
inconsistency with the Constitution's command of equality is deeper. Like
the miscegenation statutes, the sodomy statutes reflect and reinforce the
morality of a hierarchy based on birth. Just as the prohibition of miscege-
nation preserved the polarities of race on which white supremacy rested, 80
so the prohibition of sodomy preserves the polarities of gender on which
rests the subordination of women.81
Begin by considering the familiar conservative defense of the sodomy
laws, which is that the traditional prohibition of homosexual acts is neces-
sary in order to protect the family. 2 It is, at first blush, a curious notion.
Most heterosexual family members do not appear to be so eager to be-
come homosexual that only the fear of externally imposed sanctions pre-
vents them from doing so. Many homosexual relationships are, except for
the sex of the participants and the legal status of the union, indistinguish-
able from heterosexual marriages, 3 and adoption and new reproductive
technologies have made it possible for increasing numbers of gay couples
to raise children. 4 Moreover, there have been cultures in which homosex-
uality has been openly tolerated, 5 and in them families do not appear to
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869, 32 Am. Rep. 690, 699 (1878).
80. See Davis, Intermarriage in Caste Societies, 43 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (n.s.) 376, 389 (1941)
(since marriage between races would create mixed-race heirs, "either intermarriage must be strictly
forbidden or racial caste abandoned."); Saks, Reproducing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARrrAN, Fall,
1988 at 39 (anxiety about boundaries pervaded legal discourse on miscegenation).
81. This thesis is also developed in Law, Homosexuality, supra note 78.
82. This theme appears repeatedly in the briefs in Bowers, both by the state and by the amici
supporting its position. Thus the state argued that "homosexual sodomy is the anathema of the basic
units of our society-marriage and the family. To decriminalize or artificially withdraw the public's
expression of its disdain for this conduct does not uplift sodomy, but rather demotes these sacred
institutions to merely other alternative lifestyles." Brief for Petitioner at 37-38, Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140). Similar arguments appear in Brief of Amicus Catholic League for
Religious and Civil Rights at 1, Brief of Amicus Concerned Women for America Education and
Legal Defense Foundation at 2, and Brief of Amicus The Rutherford Institute at 26.
83. A study of San Francisco Bay area gays found that 29% of the men, and almost three-fourths
of the women, were currently involved in a stable relationship. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG,
HOMOSEXUALITIEs: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 91, 97 (1978). Many of
these couples foster the same intimacy, caring, and enduring commitment that are valued in the most
successful traditional marriages. See Peplau, Research on Homosexual Couples: An Overview, 8 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 3 (1982), and citations therein.
84. See generally C. PsES, CONSIDERING PARENTHOOD: A WORKBOOK FOR LESBIANS (1985).
Indeed, gays have shown enough interest in nurturing children that measures have been proposed to
forbid them from doing so. See Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 290, 530 A.2d 21 (1987) (proposed
act's exclusion of gays from foster care and adoption is constitutional, although their exclusion as
operators of child care agencies is not).
85. See, e.g., J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HoMoSExUALITY: GAY
PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOUR-
TEENTH CENTURY (1980) (homosexuality widely tolerated in Western Europe in first centuries of
Christianity and during 11th and 12th centuries).
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have been less common or enduring than they are in contemporary
America. How, then, can homosexuals be said to threaten the family?
Another datum helps to solve this mystery: Hostility to homosexuals is
linked to other traditional, restrictive attitudes about sex roles.8 6 This sug-
gests that Thomas Szasz is right: "[T]he homosexual does not threaten
society by his actual behavior but rather by the symbolic significance of
his acts." '87 Homosexuality threatens not the family as such, but a certain
traditional ideology of the family. That ideology is one in which men, but
not women, belong in the public world of work and are not so much
members as owners of their families,88 while women, but not men, should
rear children, manage homes, and obey their husbands.8 ' It has been
under stress for a long time. Intolerance of homosexuality may have an-
cient roots, but its basis is no more historically invariant than that of ra-
cism or anti-semitism. Today that basis is anxiety about the boundaries of
gender.90
Just as the central tenet of White Supremacy was the extreme differen-
tiation of the races-so extreme that intercourse between them could be
deemed "miscegenation," meaning literally the mixing of different spe-
cies-so the central tenet of the subordination of women is the extreme
differentiation of the sexes. The element of both differentiations that pro-
motes hierarchy is the idea that certain anatomical features necessarily
entail certain social roles: One's status in society is obviously and un-
problematically determined by the color of one's skin or the shape of one's
reproductive organs. Homosexuality threatens the hierarchy of the sexes
because its existence suggests that even in that realm where a person's sex
has been regarded as absolutely determinative, anatomy has less to do
with destiny than one might have supposed.
Just as miscegenation was threatening because it called into question
the distinctive and superior status of being white, homosexuality is threat-
ening because it calls into question the distinctive and superior status of
86. Numerous studies by social psychologists support this conclusion. For example, one study
found that "a major determinant of negative attitudes toward homosexuality is the need to keep males
masculine and females feminine, that is, to avoid sex-role confusion .... MacDonald & Games,
Some Characteristics of Those Who Hold Positive and Negative Attitudes Toward Homosexuals, 1 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 9, 19 (1974); see also Whitley, The Relationship of Sex-Role Orientation to
Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Homosexuals, 17 SEX ROLES 103 (1987), and citations therein.
Even if such studies did not exist, a court might reasonably draw the same conclusion from ordinary
experience. Cf infra note 96.
87. Szasz, Legal and Moral Aspects of Homosexuality, in SEXUAL INVERSION 124, 135 U,.
Marmor ed. 1965).
88. For a defense of such arrangements, which does acknowledge that they have "disadvantages
from the point of view of justice," see A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 130
(1987).
89. A description of this ideology, which focuses on its role in the anti-abortion movement but is
also useful in the present context, appears in K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITIcS OF MOTHER-
HOOD 159-75 (1984).
90. Cf Law, Homosexuality, supra note 78, at 197-206 (modem history of condemnation of
homosexuality reveals its roots in patriarchal assumptions that deny equality of women).
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being male. "[M]en cannot simultaneously be used 'as women' and stay
powerful because they are men."91 Lesbianism also challenges male privi-
lege, but in a different way: It denies that female sexuality exists, or
should exist, only for the sake of male gratification. The familiar insinua-
tion that all radical feminists are lesbians supports Adrienne Rich's specu-
lation that "men really fear. . . that women could be indifferent to them
altogether, that men could be allowed sexual and emotional. . . access to
women only on women's terms, otherwise being left on the periphery of
the matrix."
9 2
Homosexuals are a threat to the family only if the survival of the fam-
ily requires that men and women follow traditional sex roles. 93 This view
implies that the Court's consistent invalidation of laws that forcibly im-
pose such roles has been a terrible mistake; that unless law continues to
enforce rigid gender distinctions, people will no longer form stable units in
which children can thrive." It is, essentially, an argument that equality is
bad for society and inequality, good. Whatever the merits of this view, it
is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. And if the amendment
prohibits "keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place"'95
through such means as unequal insurance payments, child support re-
quirements, or alimony, what can be said on behalf of laws that enforce
role-typing by criminal penalties?
C. The Arbitrariness of the Sodomy Laws
As in McLaughlin, a court may prefer to say nothing about the troub-
ling and controversial issue of the social meaning of the challenged stat-
ute,98 and instead may choose simply to let that meaning go unnoticed. As
91. A. DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 129 (1983); see A. DWORKIN, supra note 54, ch. 8;
Stoltenberg, You Can't Fight Homophobia and Protect the Pornographers at the Same Time,
CHANGING MEN, Spring/Summer 1988, at 11.
92. Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 643 (1980).
93. See Law, Homosexuality, supra note 78, at 218-21.
94. While predictions cannot be disproven, it is noteworthy that similarly dire forecasts were
made by opponents of female suffrage, see Letter from William E. Gladstone to Samuel Smith (Apr.
11, 1892), reprinted in 2 WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND FREEDOM: THE DEBATE IN DOCUMENTS 222
(S. Bell & K. Offen eds. 1983); of racial integration, see Borders v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402, 404,
416 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, 198 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1956,
at 45; and even of the abolition of slavery, see G. FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHOUT
MASTERS (C. V. Woodward ed. 1960) (1st ed. 1857).
95. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
96. Racial discrimination cases provide numerous examples of judicial discomfort with the neces-
sity, in adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment cases, of recognizing that statutes sometimes embody
invidious social meanings. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (evading the issue
by holding that if blacks believe that segregation law "stamps the colored race with a badge of inferi-
ority," this is "not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n. 11 (1954) (relying
upon social science data to support holding that school segregation denotes inferiority of blacks); R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 705-07, 712-13 (1976) (data cited in Brown were methodolog-
ically vulnerable and unnecessary to the Court's holding, which should have rebutted Plessy by com-
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noted earlier, this is a subterfuge and therefore is intellectually unsatisfy-
ing. But it produces no injustice if, as is true of both the miscegenation
and the sodomy laws, that meaning would not be a permissible justifica-
tion for the statute anyway. (It is, however, arguable that those who value
the social roles traditionally associated with race and sex are at least enti-
tled to an explanation of why they may not use the law to impose those
roles on others, and that it is unjust for courts to intervene without provid-
ing such an explanation.97) With both miscegenation and sodomy laws,
once the law's invidious purpose is excluded from consideration no ar-
ticulable purpose remains, and the statute cannot withstand even minimal
scrutiny.
A statute "providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are
• . .similarly situated . . . violates the Equal Protection Clause."", Of
course, same-sex couples, like interracial couples, are differently situated
in that their unions have traditionally been condemned as immoral and
prosecuted as illegal. But we have seen that, because the relevant tradi-
tions contain inegalitarian premises that are inconsistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment, these are not "distinguishing characteristics relevant
to interests the State has the authority to implement." 9 And if the preser-
vation of traditional sex roles is not an interest the state may invoke, then
it is difficult to see how a state could meet its burden of proving that, for
example, women who want to have sex with women are situated differ-
ently from men who want to have sex with women.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized this in Bowers when it declared that
"For some, the sexual activity in question here serves the same purpose as
the intimacy of marriage." 00 Georgia's response, that this conclusion "has
lowered the estate of marriage . . . to merely another alternative for sex-
ual gratification," ' implies that the satisfaction of sexual gratification is
the only feature common to marriages and homosexual liaisons. This is
demonstrably false.102 By conflating all homosexual intercourse with love-
less sexual gratification, Georgia "relied upon the simplistic, outdated as-
sumption that gender could be used as a 'proxy for other, more germane
bases of classification.' "'03
mon-sense reasoning). But see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (exclusion of
blacks from juries "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferi-
ority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.").
97. Cf. J.H. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTE-
GRATION, 1954-1978 38-39 (1979) (the Brown Court's failure to articulate persuasive reasons for its
holding may have been politic, but forsook the ultimate basis of the Court's authority).
98. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
99. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
100. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
101. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 82, at 25.
102. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
103. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982) (quoting Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)). To conflate homosexuality with promiscuity, and thus with the transmis-
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The arbitrariness of these statutes is well captured by Justice Traynor's
statement in Perez v. Sharp, the first case in which a miscegenation law
was held unconstitutional: "A member of any of these races [one might
substitute "either of these sexes"] may find himself barred by law from
marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be irre-
placeable. Human beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine
that would make them as interchangeable as trains."'1 4
IV. PRUDENCE
The thesis that laws directed against lesbians and gays discriminate un-
constitutionally on the basis of gender has radical implications. If the Lov-
ing analogy is taken seriously, it follows that the equal protection clause
forbids the denial of marriage licenses to gay couples, 0 5 or the use of
homosexuality as a basis for denying custody of a child.108 The prospect of
the Court attempting to impose such results on a resistant society is, and
should be, a daunting one.
107
Miscegenation once presented a similar problem.'0 8 Although the Court
decided Brown in 1954, it avoided applying the logic of that holding to the
miscegenation issue for the next thirteen years. In 1956, it dismissed a
sion of AIDS, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus David Robinson, Jr. at 7, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (No. 85-140) ("Epidemiological concerns, evidenced by the AIDS tragedy, are inconsistent
with a recognition of a constitutional right to engage in sodomy."); Pope John Paul II, Letter to
Bishops on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1985), 32 THE POPE SPEAKs 62, 65
(1987) ("the practice of homosexuality may seriously threaten the lives and well-being of a large
number of people"), is equally simplistic. See generally Brief of Amici American Psychological Asso-
ciation and American Public Health Association at 19-27, Bowers. A statute that sought to prevent
disease by prohibiting all intercourse between gays, like one prohibiting all sexual intercourse whatso-
ever, would be "legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal." Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). "Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig." Id.
104. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 725-26, 198 P.2d 17, 25 (sub nom. Perez v. Lippold)
(1948).
105. See Law, Homosexuality, supra note 78, at 230-32.
106. The final episode in the constitutional history of miscegenation came in Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984), in which the Court reversed a state court's decision to divest a white mother of
the custody of her child because of her remarriage to a black man. The Court left undisturbed the
lower court's finding that the child, if raised by the interracial couple, would suffer from "social
stigmatization." Id. at 431 (emphasis deleted), see id. at 433-34. It held, however, that "[tihe Consti-
tution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Id. at 433. But ef.
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (reversing custody award to mother, where
living in same house with her and her lesbian lover would have caused children to "suffer from the
slings and arrows of a disapproving society"); accord S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
107. Objections about the judiciary's arrogating to itself "authority to govern the country without
express constitutional authority," Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195, are less troubling, unless one believes that
the Court's miscegenation and sex discrimination decisions, too, were "judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. at 194. Justice
White, at least, does not appear to go so far. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing White's opinion in McLaughlin); Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme
Court, 92 YALE. L.J. 913, 925 n.54 (1983) (documenting White's frequent support for Court's sex
discrimination decisions). White also joined the unanimous Loving decision.
108. On the political and psychological context within which Loving was decided, see R. SICKELS,
RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW (1972).
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challenge to the same Virginia statute that it later struck down in Lov-
ing.109 Commentators harshly criticized this disposition of the case: Her-
bert Wechsler declared that the procedural grounds relied upon by the
Court were "wholly without basis in the law," ' ° and Gerald Gunther
called the dismissal "indefensible." '
Alexander Bickel, however, thought that the Court's action was pru-
dent. While a "judgment legitimating such statutes would have been un-
thinkable, given the principle of the School Segregation Cases," their in-
validation would not have been "wise" at a time when the Court "was
subject to scurrilous attack by men who predicted that integration of the
schools would lead directly to 'mongrelization of the race' and that this
was the result the Court had really willed .... ""'
It has been suggested that the Court's holding in Bowers was animated,
and perhaps justified, by similar considerations of prudence.11" Prudence
does not, however, adequately explain or justify what the Court did.
Bickel believed that when constitutional principle clashes with expediency,
the Court ought to "stay[] its hand" by "withholding constitutional judg-
ment."'" By using its broad discretion to avoid deciding constitutional
issues that it would be imprudent to adjudicate, the Court can "maintain
itself in the tension between principle and expediency."' 15
If this is correct, then the Court's real mistake was to decide Bowers at
all. 6 Perhaps some lawlessness must be tolerated. Bickel believed that
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality "cannot in our society
109. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197
Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). The Court also denied a petition for
certiorari of a miscegenation conviction only a few months after Brown. Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S.
888 (1954). One member of the Court was reported to have remarked after leaving the Naim confer-
ence, "One bombshell at a time is enough." W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193
(1964).
110. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34
(1959).
111. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expedi-
ency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964).
112. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 174 (2d ed. 1986).
113. See, e.g., Galston, Public Morality and Religion in the Liberal State, 19 PS 807, 821
(1986):
The decision to submit this question [of the criminalization of sodomy] to the processes of
majoritarian federalism rather than resolving it through judicial nationalism allows cultural
differences among states to be reflected in their legal codes-and cultural changes to be trans-
formed into legal changes at a sustainable pace. The state-level relaxation of antisodomy
prohibitions has not for the most part generated the kind of divisive backlash that their nation-
ally mandated abolition would almost surely produce.
114. A. BICKEL, supra note 112, at 70.
115. Id. at 69.
116. Bowers came to the Court upon a writ of certiorari. By denying certiorari, the Court would
have permitted the Eleventh Circuit's invalidation of the Georgia statute to stand, but the constitution-
ality of sodomy laws would have remained unclear, since the lower courts would have been split on
the issue. Compare Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (rejecting constitutional challenge of state sodomy law) and Baker v.
Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (same) with Hardwick v.
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) (invalidating statute), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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constitute a hard and fast rule of action for universal immediate execution.
This is nothing to be proud of. It is a disagreeable fact, and it cannot be
wished away.""1 7 But there is a considerable distance between the tolera-
tion of lawlessness and its enthusiastic embrace. This is the measure of
how far the Court went wrong in Bowers.
Because the Court did what it did, it is necessary to consider whether,
as Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit recently suggested, the equal
protection issue has already been resolved by Bowers. "When conduct that
plays a central role in defining a group may be prohibited by the state,"
Reinhardt observes, "it cannot be asserted with any legitimacy that the
group is specially protected by the Constitution."11 Strictly speaking, this
overreads Bowers: The Court restricted its opinion to the privacy question,
and it expressly declined to reach issues which, if presented, might have
produced an opposite result.1 9 Still, Reinhardt's analysis probably yields
a sound prediction of how the Court would resolve the equal protection
question, given the Bowers opinion's "anti-homosexual thrust. . . and the
Court's willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of
the government."
1 20
If so, the implications are ominous and far-reaching. If constitutional
law is henceforth to enshrine the principle that laws cannot be unconstitu-
tional so long as they "have ancient roots,"121 then the entire equal pro-
tection jurisprudence of the past thirty-five years is called into doubt. If
the touchstone of constitutionality is to be "ancient roots," then laws that
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, alienage, national origin or illegiti-
macy'122 will be similarly immune from constitutional attack. 23 As the
desegregation struggles demonstrated, social practices often represent po-
litical choices, and "what once was a 'natural' and 'self-evident' ordering
later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human
potential and freedom."1 2 This recognition places the United States at a
painful crossroads. It can preserve its longstanding caste hierarchies, or it
can preserve its longstanding commitment to equality. It cannot do both.
117. A. BICKEL, supra note 112, at 69.
118. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1353 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), reh'g en
banc ordered, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988). Accord Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045, 1057 (W.D. Ark. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
119. See supra note 12.
120. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1355 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
121. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
122. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (citing
cases).
123. See, e.g., Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Va. 1952) (statute
requiring racially segregated schools does not violate Constitution, because segregation "has for gener-
ations been a part of the mores of [Virginia's] people."), reo'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (segregation law sustained as
comporting with "the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people").
124. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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Advertising and Title VIII: The
Discriminatory Use of Models in Real
Estate Advertisements
Margot S. Rubin
Many Americans begin the search for a new home by consulting news-
paper advertisements and developers' brochures that describe in words
and pictures the available housing and the surrounding community. Since
1968, the content of these advertisements has been regulated by the Fair
Housing Act. Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) makes it unlawful
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed or pub-
lished any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation,
or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.1
Claimants have recently begun to utilize this provision more exten-
sively. Plaintiffs have brought suits in Virginia, the District of Columbia,
and New York alleging that the virtual exclusion of black models2 from
real estate advertisements containing human models constitutes a violation
of section 3604(c). So far, two decisions have been rendered. In Saunders
v. General Services Corp.,' plaintiffs argued that the virtual absence of
black models from the sixty-eight photographs contained in a developer's
brochure indicated a preference based on race.4 In Spann v. Colonial Vil-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982). The Fair Housing Amendments Act, which become effective on
March 12, 1989, modify this provision as follows: "Section 806 and subsections (c), (d), and (e) of
section 804 [codified as § 3604], are each amended by inserting 'handicap, familial status,' immedi-
ately after 'sex,' each place it appears." Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, § 6(b)(1), 134 CONG.
REC. H6491, H6492 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988). The Senate passed the Amendments on Aug. 2, 1988,
134 CONG. REC. S10,562 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988), and the House concurred in the Senate version on
Aug. 8, 1988, 134 CONG. REC. H6501 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988). President Reagan signed the legisla-
tion on Sept. 13, 1988. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1988, at A29, col. 2.
2. This Note will focus on the exclusion of black models since their absence was at issue in these
cases but the discussion applies more generally to the exclusion of models representing any minority
group.
3. 659 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1987).
4. Id. at 1049.
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lage, Inc.,' plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' advertising campaigns in
the Washington Post featuring exclusively white models violated the same
provision of the Fair Housing Act.6 In both suits, the plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages to compensate indi-
vidual plaintiffs and fair housing organizations for the injuries suffered as
a result of the advertising.'
Two critical issues emerge from these cases. The first is whether plain-
tiffs must provide proof of discriminatory intent to establish a section
3604(c) violation. The decisions in Saunders and Colonial Village pro-
vide conflicting answers to this question,8 and few other cases have been
5. 662 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1987).
6. Id. at 542. Plaintiffs in Colonial Village and Saunders also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(a) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 respectively, and both alleged violations of §§ 1981 and 1982 of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1982). This Note will address only the § 3604(c)
claims.
7. Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1059; Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. at 542.
8. While cross-appeals in the Saunders case were settled leaving undisturbed the lower court
holding that intent need not be shown, plaintiffs appealed the contrary decision in Colonial Village to
the D.C. Circuit. The circuit court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for a lack of a final order
under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., No. 87-
7118 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 1988). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion in the district court seeking to
obtain a final decision regarding co-defendant Mobile Land Development Corporation. Plaintiffs
Motion For Order Entering Final Judgment at 1, Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc. (D.D.C.) (No. 86-
2917) (filed May 17, 1988). The court held that service was properly effected on Mobile. Spann v.
Colonial Village, Inc., No. 86-2917 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 13, 1988). Plaintiffs are proceeding with their
appeal, and the D.C. Circuit will have the opportunity to consider Judge Greene's decision on intent.
Id. at 2. Several similar § 3604(c) claims brought in the D.C. District Court had been stayed pending
the outcome of the Colonial Village litigation. Spann v. Restec Corp., No. 87-1156 (D.D.C. filed
Apr. 27, 1987); Spann v. Words & Co., No. 87-1154 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 27, 1987); Spann v. Zoslow
Assocs., No. 87-1155 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 27, 1987); Spann v. Carley Capital Group, No. 87-0054
(D.D.C. filed Jan. 12, 1987). The court subsequently issued a procedural decision intended to con-
serve the court's resources by discontinuing the stay, dismissing the cases without prejudice, and then
entertaining a motion for reconsideration upon resolution of the Colonial Village appeal. Spann v.
Carley Capital Group, No. 87-0054 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 30, 1988).
Even if the D.C. Circuit reverses the district court's ruling on intent, the issue probably will be
contested in other jurisdictions where the discriminatory use of human models in real estate advertise-
ments is currently being debated. On June 15, 1987, 28 complaints alleging violations of both Title
VIII and New York state law were filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights and
with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), challenging all-white human
model advertisements for 28 different complexes that appeared in the Sunday Real Estate section of
the New York Times. In approximately half of these cases, the New York State Division of Human
Rights also filed complaints challenging the advertisements under the New York Human Rights Law.
K. Scanlon, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Facts about New York
Cases (July 15, 1988) [hereinafter New York Case Summary] (on file at Yale Law Journal) (facts
concerning pending New York complaints challenging all-white model advertisements). Four lawsuits
have also been filed in the Southern District of New York to preserve the federal claims. Ragin v.
Gala Realty, No. 88 Civ. 2300 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 1, 1988); Ragin v. Rams Mktg., Inc., No. 88
Civ. 2301 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 1, 1988); Ragin v. Manhattan Mktg., Inc., No. 88 Civ. 0478
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 22, 1988); Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman & Assocs., No. 87 Civ. 9028 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Dec. 18, 1987). These cases have been put on suspense status pending the outcome of concilia-
tion efforts. New York Case Summary. Negotiations were also begun with the New York Times in an
effort to reach an agreement to adopt a policy on integrated human model advertisements similar to
the one adopted by the Washington Post requiring that at least 25% of the models portrayed in real
estate advertisements be black models. Id. See Letter from Boisfeuillet Jones, Jr., Vice President and
Counsel of the Washington Post, to Kerry Alan Scanlon (Aug. 4, 1986) (agreement reached in settle-
ment of real estate advertisement claims) (on file at Yale Law Journal); Bias Suit Over Housing Ads
By 2 Local Firms Dismissed, Wash. Post, May 23, 1987, at C1, col. 4.
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decided in the federal courts under section 3604(c).' This Note will argue
that the language of section 3604(c), the legislative history of Title VIII,
and the relevant decisions all suggest that no showing of discriminatory
intent is required.
The second emerging issue is how courts will grapple with the funda-
mental problem facing plaintiffs in this new type of litigation-how to
establish that a given human model advertising campaign "indicates a ra-
cial preference." Even if no showing of intent is required, plaintiffs must
still make a showing sufficient to constitute a valid claim of discriminatory
advertising under section 3604(c). Because of this burden, the federal
courts must now consider what types of proof are appropriate and suffi-
cient to establish a section 3604(c) claim. Drawing on the few court deci-
sions involving section 3604(c), this Note supports the "ordinary reader"
standard developed in United States v. Hunter0 and applied in Saun-
ders"1 as a solution to the problem of proof.
I. RECOGNITION OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
Courts have recognized a private cause of action 2 based on the discrim-
inatory use of models. The Saunders court recognized that the alleged
discriminatory advertising practice constituted a valid cause of action
under section 3604(c), and the Colonial Village court assumed arguendo
that the plaintiffs presented a valid claim.13 Moreover, in the mid-1970s,
five human model advertising complaints were filed by the Housing Op-
portunities Council of Metropolitan Washington. A settlement was
reached before a civil action was filed in four of these cases.1 4 In the fifth
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972); United States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Holmgren v. Little Village
Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. II1. 1971). See also infra Section IID.
10. 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
11. Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1058.
12. According to the procedures outlined in the Fair Housing Act, § 3604(c) may be enforced by
private persons bringing civil actions in federal district courts. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982). No
miminum amount in controversy is required, but the action must be filed within 180 days of the
occurrence of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). This 180-day statute
of limitations period was the focus of the Colonial Village decision. The court held that the plaintiffs
had not shown a violation within the relevant statute of limitations period. 662 F. Supp. at 546-47.
The court's more recent Memorandum and Order suggests, however, that the court may have modi-
fied its view regarding the statute of limitations. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., No. 86-2917, slip.
op. at 6 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 13, 1988) ("Only the last asserted occurrence of a practice of racial
preference need be in that 180 day period. . . . [Tihe last of defendants' all-white ads was published
within the 180-day limitations period. .. ").
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 significantly alters these enforcement provisions.
Under the new law, not only can private persons bring causes of action, but, if the Secretary deter-
mines that "reasonable cause" exists to believe that the statute has been violated, the Secretary must
issue a charge on behalf of the alleged victim. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, § 8(g)(2)(A),
134 CONG. REC. H6494 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988). In addition, the Amendments extend the statute of
limitations period, allowing plaintiffs one year to file a complaint with HUD, and two years to file a
suit in federal court. Id. at H6493-96.
13. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. at 542; Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1053.
14. Housing Opportunities Council of Metro. Washington v. Carl Freeman Assocs., Inc., No.
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case, Housing Opportunities Council of Metropolitan Washington v.
Yeonas Co.,' 5 the district court implicitly recognized that this type of
claim represented a valid cause of action by denying a motion for sum-
mary judgment.' 6 The case was subsequently settled before trial. In an-
other case," a district court entered a consent order expressly requiring
the continued use of human models "in a substantial portion of [defend-
ant's] display advertising."' 8 This provides further evidence that the pro-
visions of Title VIII apply to the discriminatory use of human models in
real estate advertisements.
Perhaps the strongest evidence for finding a cause of action in these
cases is presented by the pertinent United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) regulations. HUD is "the federal
agency primarily assigned to implement and administer Title VIII."' 9
Pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority,2 ° HUD has promulgated
regulations to "assist all advertising media, advertising agencies and all
other persons who use advertisements in complying with the proscriptions
against discrimination in advertising in Title VIII."'" These regulations
were first issued as guidelines in 1972.22 The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the agency's interpretation of its guidelines should be accorded
considerable deference by the courts when considering Fair Housing Act
claims.23
HUD reissued the guidelines as substantive regulations in 1980 "in or-
824-H-416; Housing Opportunities Council of Metro. Washington v. Ryan Homes, No. 824-H-634;
Housing Opportunities Council of Metro. Washington v. Gulf-Reston, Inc., No. 851-H-376; and
Housing Opportunities Council of Metro. Washington v. Marvin Gerstein Advertising Agency, No.
824-H-635. See Scanlon, A Report on the Committee's Fair Housing Project 1975c, 1983, 27 How.
L.J. 1457, 1459-60 (1984) (report on status of housing litigation brought by Washington Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights).
15. No. 74-1269 (D.D.C. 1974). See Scanlon, supra note 14, at 1460 n.5.
16. Scanlon, supra note 14, at 1460 n.5.
17. NAACP v. ITT Community Dev. Corp., 399 F. Supp. 366 (D.D.C. 1975).
18. Id. at 368.
19. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3535, 3608 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. Fair Housing Advertising Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,102 (1980) (final rule).
22. Advertising Guidelines for Fair Housing, 37 Fed. Reg. 6700 (1972).
23. See Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 107; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 210 (1972). The Hunter court cited the HUD advertising guidelines in support of its decision.
459 F.2d at 215 n.11. See also infra note 25 and accompanying text. The Colonial Village court,
however, found the human model regulations less than binding. The regulations describe HUD's
authority to investigate complaints and refer them to the Attorney General for action; the implementa-
tion of the policies contained in the regulations is to be considered by the Assistant Secretary of HUD
investigating complaints as evidence of compliance with § 3604(c). 24 C.F.R. § 109.30 (1987). The
court in Colonial Village emphasized this distinction and concluded: "The regulations not only do not
purport to, and they do not, apply to litigation in court, but they fail entirely to provide authority
regarding the parameters of § 3604(c) when that provision is involved in the context of such litiga-
tion." 662 F. Supp. at 545. However, the court appeared to alter its view of these regulations in its
more recent Memorandum and Order. "Defendants do not cite any case law that these regulations are
not intended to have the force of law or to govern in this litigation. The regulations are of course
entitled to substantial deference by the court when interpreting the Fair Housing Act, Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979) ... " Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., No.
86-2917, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 13, 1988).
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der to attain better enforcement and to assure consistency in obtaining
compliance with section 804(c) [now renumbered 3604]. ' '24 Courts have
held that regulations such as these which are published in the Code of
Federal Regulations are not mere statements of policy, but are regula-
tions "'having general applicability and legal effect.' "25
Regarding the race of human models, the HUD regulations state:
Human models in photographs, drawings, or other graphic tech-
niques may not be used to indicate exclusiveness on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. If models are used in display
advertising campaigns, the models should be clearly definable as rea-
sonably representing majority and minority groups in a metropolitan
area and both sexes. Models, if used, should portray persons in an
equal social setting and indicate to the general public that the hous-
ing is open to all without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, and is not for the exclusive use of one such group.26
In addition, the regulations provide: "A failure by persons placing adver-
tisements to comply with the provisions in this part when found in con-
nection with the investigation of a complaint alleging the making or use of
discriminatory advertisements will be a basis for concluding that a viola-
tion of section 804 has occured."127 These regulations clearly put housing
advertisers on notice that section 3604(c) regulates the use of human mod-
els in real estate advertisements, and that failure to comply with these
regulations constitutes a basis for finding a violation of the Fair Housing
Act.
2 8
II. THE ABSENCE OF AN INTENT REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 3604(c)
The court in Saunders held that "[i]n order to prove a violation of this
subsection [3604(c)], plaintiffs need not establish that defendants intended
to express a racial preference."2 9 Applying the ordinary reader standard,
24. Fair Housing Advertising Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,102 (1980) (final rule).
25. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis in
original). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844-45 (courts must defer to any reasonable construction of a statute by an administering agency as
long as that constriction does not contravene clear intent of Congress). In other contexts, courts have
ruled that HUD regulations have the force and effect of law. See, e.g., Blackshear Residents Org. v.
Housing Auth. of Austin, 347 F.Supp. 1138, 1145 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (HUD regulation governing
site selection of public housing projects has force of law).
26. 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b) (1987).
27. 24 C.F.R. § 109.16(a)(2) (1987).
28. See also United States v. Long, Eq. Opportunity in Hous. Rep. (P-H) % 13,631, at 14,091
(D.S.C. 1974) (use in real estate advertisements of locally understood words or phrases "which imply
or suggest race or color is presumptively illegal" under the HUD guidelines), remanded on other
grounds, 537 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976). Another section of the
Code of Federal Regulations reiterates this prohibition on the discriminatory use of models in adver-
tisements. See 12 C.F.R. § 338.2 (1987) (prohibiting discriminatory advertising by banks in promot-
ing loans).
29. 659 F. Supp. at 1058.
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the court held that the almost exclusive use of white models in this context
had a discriminatory meaning for potential black tenants and therefore
violated section 3604(c). 30 The Colonial Village court, however, stated
"that absent a showing of intent to indicate a racial preference or of other
extrinsic circumstances revelatory of a racial preference, real estate adver-
tisements do not violate the Fair Housing Act merely because models of a
particular race are not used in one ad or a series of ads."3 As a result of
these two conflicting district court decisions, the question whether a plain-
tiff must show discriminatory intent to establish a violation of section
3604(c) must be considered.
A. The Statutory Language of Section 3604(c)
The statutory language of section 3604(c) does not explicitly state
whether a showing of intent is necessary to establish a violation. However,
both the terms of the provision and the broad interpretation the Supreme
Court has given to Fair Housing Act claims suggest that no such showing
is necessary.
First, section 3604(c) is written in disjunctive form; the statute prohibits
any advertisement "that indicates any preference . . . or discrimination
based on race . . . or an intention to make any such preference .... -31
Since only the latter clause of the subsection mentions intent, it is argua-
ble that the remainder of the provision proscribes some forms of uninten-
tional conduct. In addition, section 3604(c) prohibits any advertisement,
notice, or statement that "indicates" a racial preference. The choice of this
broad word (instead of "states" or merely "discriminates") may reflect
Congress' desire to establish a strict liability standard in this provision,
particularly since it is the advertisement, not the advertiser, that so "indi-
cates." The most obvious explanation for the choice of terms is the diffi-
culty of proving an intent to discriminate in this context. 3 The word "in-
dicates" was broadly construed in United States v. Long,34 where the
court concluded that the defendant's use of the phrase "any qualified
buyer" violated section 3604(c) since that phrase was apparently used to
alert readers that the advertised properties were available to blacks. 5 The
court held that the use in real estate advertisements of locally understood
30. Id.
31. 662 F. Supp. at 546.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
33. See infra Section III. Similar standards have been adopted by Congress in other areas of
antidiscrimination law in order to ease the burden of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (Title VII); Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1982).
34. United States v. Long, Eq. Opportunity in Hous. Rep. (P-H) T 13,631, at 14,091 (D.S.C.
1974), remanded on other grounds, 537 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871
(1976).
35. Id. at 14,089-91.
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words or phrases "which imply or suggest race or color is presumptively
illegal" under the HUD guidelines.3 6
Second, Congress' purpose in enacting the Fair Housing Act was "to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States."137 Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have held
that Title VIII must be construed broadly to achieve this purpose. The
first Title VIII case decided by the Court, Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance,38 expounded this need for a broad interpretation of Title
VIII. In Trafficante, the Court described the language of the Fair Hous-
ing Act as "broad and inclusive."3" Lower courts have consistently inter-
preted Trafficante and the Act's own statement of purpose "as directives
to give the statute the broadest possible interpretation." '
Third, while it could be argued that the inclusion of the phrase "be-
cause of race" in sections 3604(a) and (b) of Title VIII'1  demands a
showing of intent,42 the phrase has not been read so restrictively. Some
courts have rejected the view that a party cannot commit an act "because
of race" unless she intends to discriminate. Instead, these courts have
adopted a broader, outcome-oriented view that a party commits an act
"because of race" whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of
that act is to discriminate between races, regardless of intent.43
In addition, the Supreme Court has only adopted this narrow interpre-
tation of the language when considering constitutional claims.44 The
36. Id. at 14,091.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
38. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
39. Id. at 209.
40. R. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 42 (1983). See also Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) makes it unlawful "[tlo refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." (emphasis added). 42
U.S.C. § 3604(b) makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." (emphasis added). Section (c) uses
the phrase "based on race" rather than "because of race," but this difference is required by the
grammatical construction, and does not justify using a different standard of intent.
42. The Supreme Court adopted this narrow view for equal protection purposes in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court's decision in Davis has generated a great deal of scholarly
literature examining the requirement of discriminatory intent in constitutional cases. See, e.g., Bell,
Foreword: Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Need for Self-Help, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
681 (1977); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Karst, Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Lawrence, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
43. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126,
147 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 US. 908 (1978).
44. In both housing and employment discrimination cases brought under the equal protection
clause, the Supreme Court requires a showing of discriminatory intent. See Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (housing); Washington v. Davis, 426
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phrase "because of race" has been understood in other contexts to require
no showing of intent. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,45 the Supreme Court
did not narrowly construe the phrase "because of race" contained in sec-
tion 703(h) of Title VII to require proof of discriminatory intent to estab-
lish a violation of the provision. Instead, the Court focused on Congress'
purpose in enacting Title VII-namely the achievement of equal employ-
ment opportunity-and interpreted Title VII broadly to implement that
purpose, holding that any employment practice that operates to exclude
blacks and cannot be shown to relate to job performance is prohibited
regardless of the intent of the parties.46 The same phrase in Title VIII, a
parallel provision of the Civil Rights Act, should be interpreted in the
same manner.
47
B. The Legislative History of the Fair Housing Act
The legislative history of the Fair Housing Act is somewhat sparse, but
the available record does suggest that Congress did not seek to require a
showing of intent to establish a violation. While Congress considered fair
housing legislation for more than two years, Title VIII itself was the sub-
ject of relatively little debate. The legislation was enacted based on Sena-
tor Dirksen's floor amendment, and the committee reports and other docu-
ments which usually accompany major legislation are not available in this
instance. Neither the House Judiciary Committee Report48 nor the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report49 addressed the issue of fair housing because
a fair housing provision was not included in the 1967 legislation.5" As a
result, the legislative history of Title VIII must be gleaned primarily from
the congressional floor debates, especially the debates in the Senate.5"
During the floor debate prior to the passage of the Act, Senator Baker
introduced an amendment that would have required proof of discrimina-
tory intent to establish a Title VIII claim.52 Under Baker's proposal,53 a
U.S. 229 (1976) (employment).
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id. at 431.
47. See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128 (1976) (arguing that requiring proof of specific intent is too confining and
that doctrine of prima facie case applied to Title VII litigation should also be used to evaluate Title
VIII claims).
48. H.R. REP. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1967).
49. S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 1837.
50. Only the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency held hearings to consider similar fair housing legislation proposed by Senator Mondale.
See Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 197 (1967).
51. It should be noted that § 3604(c) was never specifically mentioned during the congressional
floor debate. For a general discussion of the legislative history of Title VIII, see Dubofsky, Fair
Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); R. SCHWEMM,
supra note 40, at 32-36.
52. 114 CONG. REC. 5214 (1968).
53. Senator Baker's amendment did not focus on § 3604. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit included
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homeowner would violate the Fair Housing Act only if she specifically
instructed a real estate agent to discriminate. Many Senators objected to
the proposal. Senator Percy forcefully argued that proof of a specified ra-
cial preference to establish a violation of Title VIII "would be impossible
to produce."154 Senator Mondale, the original sponsor of the Fair Housing
Act, offered specific examples of the potential difficulty of meeting this
burden of proof. "[I]n a case in which the seller and his agent agree to
discriminate, but do not do so in writing or in some other tangible form of
outside evidence, there would be no way to prove that they in fact had
violated the amendment.1 55 After an extensive debate of this issue, the
Senate rejected Baker's amendment 56 and thereby declined to adopt an
intent requirement. These events support the conclusion that Congress did
not seek to require a showing of intent to establish a violation of the
statute.
C. Intent Not Required in Previous Section 3604(c) Cases
While there is an apparent conflict as to whether intent is required in
cases alleging the discriminatory use of models in real estate advertise-
ments, most courts ruling on other section 3604(c) claims closely follow
the statute and require only that the challenged statement "indicates a
racial preference." In Mayers v. Ridley,57 the D.C. Circuit directly ad-
dressed the question of whether section 3604(c) requires a showing of in-
tent. In that case, the court held that the filing of instruments containing
racially restrictive covenants by the Recorder of Deeds for the District of
Columbia is prohibited by Title VIII, regardless of the Recorder's in-
tent.58 "Whether he [the Recorder] has thought of it before or not, when
the Recorder [of Deeds] publishes the notice of the sale of a dwelling, i.e.,
records a deed containing discriminatory racial covenants for the world to
see, he is engaging in an act unlawful under § 3604(c). . . . Similarly,
in United States v. Hunter,"0 the leading case involving section 3604(c),"1
a discussion of this aspect of the legislative history in construing § 3604. See Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
54. 114 CONG. REc. 5216 (1968).
55. Id. at 5218.
56. The Senate vote on Baker's amendment was 43 yeas and 48 nays. Id. at 5221-22.
57. 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (en bane).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 650 (Wilkey, J., concurring) (emphasis added). But see Woodward v. Bowers, 630 F.
Supp. 1205 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (Recorder of Deeds did not violate Title VIII by accepting deed with
racially restrictive covenant).
60. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
61. Hunter involved an action to enjoin a newspaper from publishing advertisments that were
allegedly discriminatory. The Fourth Circuit's opinion addressed several significant issues relating to
§ 3604(c). First, the court held that the language of the statute makes it clear that Congress intended
that the statute apply to newspapers and other media carrying discriminatory advertisements, even
though someone else may have drafted and placed the advertisement. 459 F.2d at 210. Second, the
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, describing the Act as a valid exercise of Congress'
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the Fourth Circuit held that the appearance of advertisements stating that
apartments were available in a "white only" home indicated a racial pref-
erence and therefore violated the Fair Housing Act.62
Despite the fact that an intentional discriminator was involved in both
Mayers and Hunter, no showing of discriminatory intent was required in
either case. A Texas district court succinctly summarized the state of the
law in February, 1987: "The prevalent interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(c) requires no discriminatory intent for a violation to occur."1
63
D. Section 3604 and the Discriminatory Effects Standard
While few courts have directly considered the construction and applica-
tion of the terms of section 3604(c),64 many circuit courts have considered
the broad issue of whether a showing of intent is necessary to establish a
Title VIII violation when a facially neutral act is challenged. 5 These de-
cisions have involved section 3604 generally, or sections 3604(a) and (b),
but not (c).66 A review of this related case law supports the argument that
no showing of discriminatory purpose is required.
Many of the decisions concerning section 3604 have involved cases
where the challenged housing practice appears neutral on its face but is
alleged to be discriminatory. In these cases, courts have been forced to
consider whether plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent, or if only
discriminatory effect must be shown. They have responded with a prima
facie "impact" or "effects" test,67 first developed by the Eighth Circuit in
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery. Id. at 214.
Third, the court concluded that § 3604(c) did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 211.
'First Amendment concerns were mentioned by the court in Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. at 546,
and will probably appear in future litigation challenging the discriminatory use of models. As the
court in Colonial Village recognized, upholding the plaintiffs' claims in these cases raises the "prob-
lem of the chilling effect of such burdens on advertisers' ability and desire to advertise . . . ." Id.
Advertisers may be chilled from showing any models in their advertisements or feel compelled to
include at least one model representing each minority in the community. Id. at 545. Although the
Fourth Circuit's analysis of the First Amendment issue in Hunter was based on Valentine v. Chris-
tensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1941), which preceded the recent Supreme Court commercial speech decisions,
its conclusion is probably still correct. The Court has reaffirmed its holding in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), and has refused to extend First
Amendment protection to commercial speech related to illegal activity. See Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) ("government may regulate or ban entirely"
commercial speech "proposing an illegal transaction").
62. 459 F.2d at 214.
63. United States v. University Oaks Civic Club, 653 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
(isolated and sporadic recording of deeds with racially restrictive covenants not pattern of discrimina-
tory conduct in violation of Title VIII).
64. See supra note 9.
65. A showing of discriminatory effect is required only in cases involving challenges to facially
neutral acts; no showing of effect or intent is required in cases involving facially discriminatory con-
duct. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
66. For the text of subsections (a) and (b) of § 3604, see supra note 41.
67. Under prima facie analysis, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant's housing practice has
had a discriminatory effect. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the practice is
justifiable on other, nonracial grounds. If the prima facie inference of discrimination is not satisfacto-
rily explained by the defendant, a violation is established. See R. SCHVEMM, supra note 40, at 61. See
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Williams v. Matthews Co."' Williams held that a developer's facially neu-
tral policy of selling lots in a subdivision only to approved builders oper-
ated to exclude blacks from acquiring lots in the subdivision and was
prima facie discriminatory. 9 The Williams court held that no showing of
discriminatory intent was necessary to establish a violation,70 and that the
concept of "prima facie case" applies to housing discrimination "as much
as it does to discrimination in other areas of life."
7 1
Later that same year in United States v. City of Black Jack,2 the
Eighth Circuit offered a more detailed explanation of how this effect-
oriented prima facie standard should be applied to Fair Housing Act
claims:
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff
need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant actually
or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words that it
has a discriminatory effect. The plaintiff need make no showing
whatsoever that the action resulting in racial discrimination in
housing was racially motivated. Effect, and not motivation, is the
touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their moti-
vations, but more importantly, because ". . . whatever our law was
once, . . . we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.""
The Seventh Circuit's landmark decision in Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights4 presents the most con-
also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (clarifying requirements set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination in Title VII cases). While the ordinary reader standard advocated by this Note might
be described by a layman in terms of the "effect" or "impact" on the ordinary reader, the standard is
not a variant of the "impact" or "effects" tests which are terms of art in housing law.
68. 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). This case involved alleged viola-
tions of § 3604(a) and (b), not (c), but the court referred generally to § 3604 in its decision. 499 F.2d
at 826.
69. Id. at 826-27.
70. id.
71. Id.
72. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). Plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of § 3604(a), not (c).
73. 508 F.2d at 1184-85 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967),
affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc)) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit has continued to use a prima facie standard to evaluate Title
VIII claims. See Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977) (following Williams and Black
Jack to hold that black renter had been denied apartment because of racial discrimination in violation
of Title VIII). The Second and Ninth Circuits also use the prima facie standard to evaluate Title
VIII claims. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979) (black plaintiff met
prima facie burden in showing that defendant corporation refused to permit him to purchase coopera-
tive apartment because of race); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff met prima facie burden by showing discriminatory effect of defendant's adults-only rental
policy).
74. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) [hereinafter Arlington
Heights II].
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vincing evidence that no showing of intent is required to establish that
facially neutral conduct violates Title VIII. Plaintiffs brought suit to com-
pel the village of Arlington Heights to rezone their property to permit
construction of federally financed low-cost housing, alleging that the vil-
lage's refusal to rezone the property was racially discriminatory. After
trial, the district court held that the refusal to rezone was motivated by a
desire to protect property values and maintain the prevailing zoning plan,
not by a desire to discriminate racially. 5 The Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that despite the village's lack of discriminatory intent in its refusal
to rezone, the "ultimate effect" of the refusal was discriminatory and
therefore violated the equal protection clause.76 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and resolved the constitutional issue, holding that under
Washington v. Davis, a showing of discriminatory intent is a prerequisite
to establishing a violation of the equal protection clause. Since the Seventh
Circuit had affirmed the district court's finding that there was no discrim-
inatory intent behind the village's actions, the Supreme Court reversed.
But the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for consideration
of the plaintiff's Title VIII claims, implying that a showing of proof dif-
ferent from that necessary for equal protection claims governs Title VIII
violations.
7 7
On remand in Arlington Heights II, the Seventh Circuit focused only
on whether the village's refusal to rezone violated the Fair Housing Act
because the action had a discriminatory effect. Relying on the Supreme
Court's holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.71 that a prima facie case of
employment discrimination could be established under Title VII without a
showing of discriminatory intent, the Seventh Circuit held that this Title
VII standard should be applied to at least some Title VIII claims.7 Like
the drafters of the provision, 0 the court recognized the difficulty of prov-
ing intent in Fair Housing Act claims and instead adopted an impact
standard. In the case before it, the Seventh Circuit held that the village's
refusal to rezone violated section 3604(a) even though no discriminatory
intent was shown."'
All the circuit courts which have considered this issue agree with the
75. 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
76. 517 F.2d 409, 412-15 (7th Cir. 1975).
77. 429 U.S. 252, 268-71 (1977). See also Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d
Cir. 1977) ("In remanding, rather than directing the dismissal of the Arlington Heights litigation, the
Court at least implied that considerations other than those necessary for proof of equal protection
violations must govern Title VIII claims."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
78. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
79. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289-90.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
81. Shortly after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Arlington Heights II, the Third Circuit ad-
dressed the same issue in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo. There, the Third Circuit recognized the
distinction between the constitutional and Title VIII claims made in Arlington Heights II and held, as
did the Seventh Circuit, that only constitutional claims require a showing of discriminatory purpose.
564 F.2d at 147.
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Seventh Circuit that to challenge facially neutral conduct, a plaintiff may
show either discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent to establish a
section 3604(a) or (b) violation.82 But these decisions do not impose an
obligation to show discriminatory effect when the plaintiff is challenging a
practice that is discriminatory on its face. A distinction must be drawn
between cases involving facially neutral acts, like Arlington Heights II,
and those involving facially discriminatory acts. For example, if it were
shown that a landlord required blacks to provide more evidence of ability
to pay or more references than whites, that discriminatory practice would,
by itself, violate section 3604(b).8" Similarly, a showing of discriminatory
effect is not necessarily required to establish liability under section
3604(c). Thus, if an advertisement were to state "blacks not wanted," it
would violate section 3604(c) in and of itself, just as an advertisement for
apartments in a "white only" home would.84 Likewise, a long-running
advertisement campaign that continually uses only white models in a met-
ropolitan area that has a significant black or other minority population,
on its face, "indicates [a] preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race." Plaintiffs should not be required to prove the "discriminatory ef-
fect" of these advertisements; they should only be required to show that
the advertisements convey a discriminatory message to minority readers.
To assess how a plaintiff can meet this burden in a particular case, the
use of human models in advertisements must be considered.
E. The Significance of the Use of Models in Advertisements
Advertisers design advertisements using human models so that targeted
consumers will identify positively with the models in the advertisement
and buy the product.8 6 Advertisers carefully choose the models to be fea-
tured because "[i]f the viewer likes the people in the scene, and if there is
someone in the illustration he might like to be, this produces positive re-
82. See cases cited supra notes 73, 81. See also Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.
1986) (following other circuit court decisions and finding that plaintiffs could succeed under the Fair
Housing Act by showing discriminatory effect); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th
Cir. 1973) (refusal to sell homes to blacks and discrimination against blacks in terms and conditions
violates Title VIII regardless of intent), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Mayers v. Ridley, 465
F.2d 630, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (en banc) (filing of instruments containing racially
restrictive covenants violates Title VIII regardless of Recorder's intent). In the most significant recent
decision in this area, Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit
held that the defendant's all-adult rental policy had a discriminatory effect on minorities in violation
of § 3604. The Fourth Circuit's opinion only addressed the question of discriminatory effect; the
district court's holding that defendants had successfully rebutted plaintiff's proof of discriminatory
intent was not challenged. In sum, the 10 circuit courts to consider this issue have all adopted the
same position. The First and Tenth Circuits have not yet addressed this question.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973) (refusing to sell
homes to blacks and discriminating against blacks in terms and conditions of sale violates Title VIII
regardless of intent), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
84. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982).
86. G. DYER, ADVERTISING AS COMMUNICATING 96 (1982).
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sponses." a The plaintiffs in these suits have argued, and most laymen
and advertising experts readily acknowledge, that an advertiser's choice of
a model's race, as well as other important personal characteristics such as
sex and age, is rarely accidental.8 The construction of advertisements de-
picting white models with whom consumers will identify might create an
inference that advertisers intentionally seek to appeal to one racial group.
While it might seem that advertisers' motives when designing these ads
may be unobjectionable and might simply reflect the fact that there are
more white households than non-white households,89 such advertising
must be considered in the historical context in which it developed. White
models have been used in housing advertisements in conjunction with
more explicit techniques of indicating a racial preference. From the late
nineteenth century until the 1960s, newspapers listed a separate
"Colored" section at the end of each category of real estate advertisements
in the classified columns.90 Newspapers continued to print advertisements
with explicitly stated preferences like "white only" home91 into the early
1970s. As these more explicit techniques were abandoned, housing adver-
tisers began relying on subtle word and picture cues which had the effect
of signalling to both whites and blacks to whom the housing was open.92
In sum:
[C]urrent advertising practices must be examined in light of the his-
torical legacy of segregation and discrimination that have dominated
the field of housing in all but the past few years of our nation's
history. This is particularly necessary if one is to appreciate the ef-
fect of housing advertising on the minority market. Pictures, words,
and phrases that were almost assuredly used with a discriminatory
intent in housing ads ten or twenty years ago . . . are likely to con-
87. S. BRITT, PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 161
(1978) (citing S. BAKER, VISUAL PERSUASION (1961)). The effect of advertisements on consumer
decisions is the subject of some debate. While Britt argues that consumers respond to advertisements
and millions of dollars are spent each year based on this premise, others such as Michael Schudson
claim that advertisements do not control people's choices and that an advertisement's effectiveness is
influenced significantly by the context within which it is shown. See M. SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING:
THE UNEASY PERSUASION (1984).
88. The district court in Saunders recognized this fact:
It requires no expert to recognize that human models in advertising attempt to create an iden-
tification between the model, the consumer, and the product. In other words, advertisers choose
models with whom the targeted consumers will positively identify, hoping to convey the mes-
sage that people like the depicted models consume and enjoy the advertised product. Therefore,
if the consumer wants to emulate the model, he or she will use the product, too.
659 F. Supp. at 1058.
89. The latest data indicate that there are 76,576,000 white households in the United States,
compared to 9,797,000 black households. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1988 STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 44.
90. See C. RENDE, FAIR HOUSING: UNFAIR ADVERTISING 18-19 (1977).
91. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
92. C. RENDE, supra note 90, at 19 (citing G. GRIER, BIAS IN NEWSPAPER REAL ESTATE AD-
VERTISING (1971)).
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tinue to have that effect today, and for many years to come, even
though the intent of advertisers may no longer be the same.9"
The success of litigation challenging the nearly exclusive use of white
models may depend upon showing that this advertising practice is
designed to persuade consumers who identify with the models portrayed
or to dissuade those who do not identify with the models. If only white
models are used in a series of real estate advertisements, potential black
tenants may interpret the advertisements to say that only white tenants,
like those portrayed, are welcome. Several studies indicate that the current
portrayal of blacks in advertisements convey similar messages and thereby
promote discriminatory stereotypes of these groups.94 Both of the plain-
tiff's expert witnesses who testified in Saunders provided additional evi-
dence based on academic and market research that black readers inter-
preted these advertisements to indicate a preference for white tenants.95
The available data support the conclusion of the HUD regulations98 that
the failure to use models "reasonably representing majority and minority
groups in a metropolitan area" indicates to the general public that the
housing is not "open to all without regard to race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. ' '9 7 The federal courts should follow Saunders' lead in rec-
ognizing the discriminatory message of these advertisements to black and
other readers.
F. The "Deterrent Effect" of Discriminatory Advertisements
The discriminatory nature of advertisements depicting virtually all
white models is consonant with the wide range of behavior that the courts
have come to recognize as discriminatory.98 For example, in employment
93. Id. See also United States v. Long, Eq. Opportunity in Hous. Rep. (P-H) T 13,631 at 14,089,
(D.S.C. 1974) (court focused on context in which reader would understand challenged real estate
advertisements and held phrase "any qualified buyer" violated § 3604(c) because it was "apparently
used in Charleston to alert readers that the advertised properties were available to blacks ..."),
remanded on other grounds, 537 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
94. See D. AAKER & J. MEYERS, ADVERTISING MANAGEMENT 503-04 (2d ed. 1982).
95. 659 F. Supp. at 1058.
96. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
98. One area where courts have expanded the definition of discriminatory harm has been in rec-
ognizing the discriminatory impact on black Americans of certain symbols. See Melton v. Young, 465
F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972) (student suspended for wearing Confederate flag patch), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 951 (1973); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970) (all
Confederate flags must be removed from schools since such symbols indicate racial prejudices), aff d,
448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971). Similarly, courts have interpreted Title VII's language broadly to
prohibit another complex form of discrimination, namely the creation of a discriminatory or "hostile"
work environment. See Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1971) (per Goldberg, J., with one Circuit Judge concurring in the result), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972) (Title V1I's phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" is an expansive concept
which prohibits creation of discriminatory work environment); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545
F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Rogers and holding that pattern of hiring, promoting and
soliciting black employees created discriminatory work environment in violation of Title VII), cert.
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discrimination litigation, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that peo-
ple deterred from applying for jobs by discriminatory employment prac-
tices are as much "victim[s] of discrimination as is he who goes through
the motions of submitting an application." 99 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
has recognized the deterrent effect discriminatory practices may have in
housing, holding that an inference of discrimination can arise even if no
blacks have applied for the housing. "[Sleeing large numbers of 'white
only' advertisements in one part of a city may deter non-whites from ven-
turing to seek homes there . ... "100
The exclusion of black models from real estate advertisements might
also deter blacks from even applying to buy or rent property. The court in
Saunders recognized that while advertisers deliberately choose models
with whom targeted consumers will identify, these same advertisements
may have a deterrent effect on others:
[I]t is natural that readers of the Lifestyle brochure would look at the
human models depicted as representing the kinds of individuals that
live in and enjoy GSC apartment complexes. If a prospective tenant
positively identified with the models, the message conveyed would be
that "I belong in these apartments. 'My kind of people' live there."
Conversely, if the prospective tenant reading the brochure saw no
models with whom he or she could identify, the reader would obtain
a message that "these apartments are not for me or 'my kind.' "101
Even though these tenants may never have actually applied for the hous-
ing in question, they are clearly victims of the discriminatory advertising
practice.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PROOF
Although the Fair Housing Act was enacted twenty years ago, the fed-
eral courts have rarely been asked to resolve section 3604(c) claims. Types
of advertisements previously held to be prohibited under section 3604(c)
include a newspaper advertisement offering for rent a furnished apart-
ment in what was described as a "white only" home,102 a newspaper ad-
vertisement indicating a preference for tenants who spoke a specific lan-
guage,' 03 statements by a managing agent to tenants that blacks are not
permitted on the premises and cannot be entertained as guests, 0 4 and a
denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). See also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (citing
Rogers and validating Title VII hostile work environment claim in context of sexual harassment).
99. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366 (1977).
100. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
101. 659 F. Supp. at 1058. Similarly, when advertisements portray elderly models only, many
people assume the housing depicted is senior citizen housing.
102. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
103. Holmgren v. Little Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. I1. 1971).
104. United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
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landlord's oral statement to a current white tenant who was soliciting pro-
spective tenants for her apartment to "make sure her friends were
white."" 5
These decisions all reflect the traditional methods of discrimination in
housing advertisements: The advertisements or statements explicitly indi-
cate a racial preference and therefore violate the statute. The virtual pre-
clusion of non-white models may not be perceived initially as discrimina-
tory because these advertisements do not in so many words exclude
prospective black tenants or purchasers. Nonetheless, the practice may be
discriminatory because it may "indicate a racial preference" to potential
black tenants in the same way as the prohibited practices described above.
Nevertheless, a challenge to the use of human models in real estate
advertisements presents unique problems of determining whether the ad-
vertisements "indicate a racial preference," problems that an advertise-
ment stating "whites only" does not. The court's decision in Colonial Vil-
lage, for example, focused on "the problem of the practical ramifications
of their claims were these to be sustained."108 If this judicial wariness is to
be overcome, it must be determined exactly which advertisements depict-
ing human models are prohibited by the statute, and what constitutes
proof of the discriminatory message of these advertisements.
A. The Number and Nature of the Challenged Real Estate
Advertisements
Because of the unique nature of the alleged discriminatory practice, one
question that must be considered in these cases is how many suspect ad-
vertisements a plaintiff must refer to in order to establish a section
3604(c) claim. In Colonial Village and Saunders, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the exclusive use of white models in a series of advertisements and
throughout a brochure; the plaintiffs did not contend that the presence of
exclusively white models in isolated advertisements constituted a violation.
The reason for requiring an advertising campaign or brochure rather than
isolated advertisements reflects the uniqueness of the problem presented
by these cases. As the court in Colonial Village noted, one advertisement
featuring only white models may be used without creating a legal infer-
ence that the advertisement intends to exclude or has an exclusionary ef-
fect. 107 The opposite legal inference could make advertisements with
human models impractical, since every advertisment would have to in-
clude numerous models to represent each minority group in the commu-
nity to avoid violating the statute.'0 8 The real question, however, is how
105. United States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
106. 662 F. Supp. at 545.
107. Id. at 545 n.7.
108. Id. at 545.
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many models must be depicted before there is a sufficient number to de-
termine that blacks are indeed not being portrayed in any meaningful
number. Courts need not fear being confronted with endless challenges to
individual advertisements if plaintiffs are required to allege a series of
discriminatory advertisements or a single publication with a significant
number of models.109
Another issue raised by these new discrimination claims concerns
whether complete or virtual exclusion of black models from these advertis-
ing campaigns must be demonstrated to establish a violation. Obviously,
the complete exclusion of black models is not required. As the court's deci-
sion in Saunders indicates, the inclusion of a few black models in the
brochure did not alter the fact that the overwhelming paucity of black
models indicated a racial preference and had a deterrent effect."" In addi-
tion, if complete exclusion were required, advertisers could easily avoid
the reach of the statute by using a token black model in one picture in
every brochure or campaign regardless of the ultimate effect of the entire
brochure or campaign on prospective black tenants. Instead, the appropri-
ate standard should be the one specified in the HUD regulations: The
human models depicted must be "clearly definable as reasonably repre-
senting majority and minority groups in a metropolitan area."111
These new cases present another similar issue, namely whether a series
of advertisements that includes other racial groups but no blacks, or exclu-
sively depicts black models, violates section 3604(c). Again, the HUD reg-
ulations discussed previously" 2 indicate a possible answer to this question:
If models are used, they should reasonably represent the majority and mi-
nority groups in a metropolitan area, whatever those groups are in a given
community, to indicate that the housing is not open solely to one group.
While the courts in both Colonial Village and Saunders rejected the ar-
gument that the regulations or statute requires that black models be used
in strict proportion to their presence in the metropolitan area," 3 the regu-
lations do suggest guidelines to be followed.
109. Requiring that discriminatory advertisements occur in a significant number to be actionable
raises the question of how many advertisements constitute such a number. The courts may have diffi-
culty defining this number in situations in which an advertiser has decided to run occasional advertise-
ments to solicit tenants. However, real estate advertisements frequently occur either in the form of a
brochure (as in Saunders) or as part of a general advertising campaign spanning several weeks (as in
Colonial Village). In these circumstances, the nature of the advertising arrangement will allow the
courts to determine a statutory violation with relative ease.
110. 659 F. Supp. at 1058-59.
111. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
112. Id.
113. 662 F. Supp. at 544; 659 F. Supp. at 1060.
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B. The Difficulties of Statistical Proof
If a plaintiff does allege the virtual exclusion of black models from a
series of advertisements, a further problem remains: She must still con-
vince the court that the advertisements "indicate a racial preference." For
example, proof of the discriminatory nature of such advertisements does
not lend itself to statistical analysis. Statistics showing the number of
black residents in an apartment complex may or may not be related to
that development's advertising practices. In addition, it is practically im-
possible to gather information from every black reader of these advertise-
ments who did not apply as a result. The court in Saunders acknowl-
edged some of these methodological and statistical problems in its
assessment of the expert testimony offered in the case.11 Perhaps in light
of these difficulties, no court that has considered a section 3604(c) claim
has invoked a standard of statistical proof. Instead, these courts, particu-
larly the Fourth Circuit in Hunter and the district court in Saunders,
have applied a standard more suitable to the language and terms of sec-
tion 3604(c), the ordinary reader standard.
C. The Ordinary Reader Standard
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Hunter set forth a clear standard by
which advertisements challenged under section 3604(c) should be evalu-
ated. According to that decision, a violation of section 3604(c) is proven if
"[t]o the ordinary reader the natural interpretation of the advertisements
published . . . is that they indicate a racial preference in the acceptance of
tenants."11 5 In Hunter, the court held that an ordinary reader would nat-
urally interpret the advertisements to indicate a racial preference.' In
Saunders, the court applied this test and found that to the ordinary
reader, the natural interpretation of the challenged advertisements was
that they indicated a preference for white tenants.1
17
The ordinary reader standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit and the
District Court in Virginia is in accord with the broad congressional objec-
tive underlying the Fair Housing Act. The standard recognizes the diffi-
culty of obtaining statistical proof from readers and instead asks the court
(or the jury, since such ordinary person standards are usually factual stan-
dards applied by the trier of fact)" 8 to determine how ordinary readers
might naturally have interpreted these advertisements. To require more
114. 659 F. Supp. at 1058.
115. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 215.
116. The Fourth Circuit also stated that a natural interpretation of the advertisements would lead
the ordinary reader to conclude that the writer of the advertisements intended to indicate a racial
limitation. Id. at 215.
117. 659 F. Supp. at 1058.
118. For a discussion of ordinary person (or "reasonable man") standards, see W. PROSSER & W.
KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 32-33 (5th ed. 1984).
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would undermine the congressional objective of eliminating racial discrim-
ination in housing, since statistical evidence of the effects of advertisements
is virtually impossible to gather, and the discriminatory intent of advertis-
ers and developers is often impossible to discern. It seems implausible to
suggest that Congress intended to require a burden of proof that would
severely limit the scope of this provision, especially in light of Congress'
broadly stated objective and the HUD regulations which accompanied the
legislation." 9 If a plaintiff can show that an ordinary reader would natu-
rally interpret the advertisements to indicate a racial preference, the plain-
tiff has proven a violation of the provision.
Clearly, the ordinary reader standard poses many problems of its own.
The standard does not give an exact measure of discriminatory effect, and
raises obvious questions: Who is the ordinary reader? What is a natural
interpretation of an advertisement? But such questions are not unfamiliar
to courts and juries who often apply this type of standard to evaluate how
an ordinary person would act in a particular situation.120 These questions
involve the innate subjectivity of determining what "indicates a racial
preference" to whom, and will arise whenever an "ordinary person" or
"natural interpretation" standard is used. 2' Few judicial standards are
without ambiguities. Nonetheless, the ordinary reader standard offers a
necessary alternative to statistical proof and represents a feasible means of
evaluating allegedly discriminatory advertisements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of virtually all-white models in housing advertisments is a ves-
tige of a long history of housing discrimination through advertising. In
increasing numbers, federal courts are being asked to consider claims that
these advertisements violate section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act. Un-
like previous section 3604(c) decisions, these suits challenge a pictorial
advertising technique. Nonetheless, this advertising practice, like the more
explicit discriminatory practices previously outlawed, conveys a message to
potential non-white tenants that they are not welcome at the advertised
housing. The courts should recognize that the messages conveyed by these
119. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
120. In the area of defamation law, for example, judges and juries are frequently asked to deter-
mine how an ordinary reader would interpret a given publication. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 563 comment c (1976) ("In determining the reasonableness of the recipient's understanding,
that meaning is to be given to words which is ordinarily attached to them by persons familiar with the
language used.").
121. This question becomes especially difficult in the context of discrimination. Professor Minow
has argued that "difference" makes it difficult for dominant groups to appreciate the legal claims of
others and urges judges to recognize their own biases and adopt different perspectives. This provides
an additional reason why the ordinary black reader's discriminatory interpretation should be sufficient
to show a violation, although such advertisements may also, of course, seem equally discriminatory to
a white reader. See Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreward: Justice Endangered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
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series of all-white advertisements reinforce discriminatory housing
patterns.
Less explicit forms of discrimination, however, may present different
problems of proof. The statutory language of section 3604(c) and the leg-
islative history of Title VIII both suggest that Congress recognized the
difficulty of proving an intent to discriminate in certain situations and
sought to establish a burden of proof that did not require a demonstration
of discriminatory purpose. The federal courts have adopted a broad read-
ing of Title VIII and have held that no showing of discriminatory purpose
is required to prove a violation of the Act. The same legal standard should
govern these new section 3604(c) claims.
Plaintiffs still must prove the discriminatory nature of these human-
model advertisements. While minority underrepresentation and disparate
impact standards have been used in many cases, these standards of proof
have not been and should not be applied to section 3604(c) claims. In-
stead, the federal courts should apply the ordinary reader test to section
3604(c) claims, including those now being brought to challenge the use of
virtually all-white models in real estate advertisements. If the discrimina-
tory nature of these ads is properly recognized and the appropriate stan-
dard of proof is applied, future plaintiffs will be successful in eradicating
this discriminatory advertising practice.
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